Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus
The career of Pompey in the Late Roman Republic.
Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (106-47 BC) — ‘Pompey the Great’ — was born in 106 BC in the northern Italian town of Picenum. Though not a native Roman family, the Pompeys were moderately successful at making inroads into Senate seats. His father, Pompey Strabo, was elected consul in 89 BC, and was an accomplished general who served Rome in the Marsic Social War, as well as the civil wars of Marius and Sulla. By the age of 17, Pompey was an active participant in his father’s campaigns and was busily building a foundation for his own military career.
Pompey rose to prominence serving Sulla in the first major Roman civil war, defeating the forces of Marius in Africa at twenty-three years old. For this he earned, or was mocked with, the title of Magnus (‘the Great’). While still a private citizen, he was given propraetorian imperium (the right to command an army). Involved in only a short time in Roman civil affairs, Pompey quickly learned the political power of an army behind him. After Sulla, and despite having no experience as a Roman magistrate, he coerced a command in Spain against the rebel Sertorius, simply through fear of his legions. While the war was not exactly a clear cut victory for Pompey as the opposing army was only defeated after Sertorius was murdered, Pompey returned to Rome in triumph.
Upon returning from Spain, Pompey helped mop up the war with the gladiator general Spartacus, claiming much of the credit in the process. He and M. Licinius Crassus, who conducted the bulk of the operation against Spartacus, built a dangerous rivalry in the process. In order to avoid more potential civil disorder, as both men maintained considerable armies, both were elected as consul for the year 70 BC. In their joint consulship, the two worked together repealing the bulk of Sulla’s constitutional reforms, but otherwise had little use for one another.
Regardless, Pompey enjoyed considerable favouritism among the masses, as well as the army. Despite fears of a new Sullan military dictatorship, as the Senatorial class deeply distrusted Pompey, he received numerous special powers in his career. Perhaps to appease a man who was in a position to possibly march on Rome, or to truly honour a capable general with the best chance of Roman victory, the Senate reluctantly tolerated Pompey. Both during and after Pompey’s consulship, problems in the east were persistent. Piracy and Rome’s old enemy, Mithridates, continued to stir up trouble, and the tribune A. Gabinius passed a law transferring command of the Mithridatic campaign to the current Consul Glabrio. Pompey was also granted unparalleled authority in defeating the Cilician pirates who ravaged shipping throughout the Mediterranean. Pompey’s command would go so well, in fact, that by the time Glabrio took his post against Mithridates, another tribune, C. Manilius was proposing more changes.
In 66 BC, despite fierce Senatorial Optimate opposition, the Lex Manilia was passed granting Pompey unlimited power in the eastern territories. Ironically enough, it was the oration of the lifelong Republican defender Marcus Tullius Cicero, which pushed the proposal into law. In 55 BC Pompey was elected consul for the second time. As the political situation in Rome deteriorated and civil strife seemed imminent, the Senate looked to Pompey for protection. In 52 BC he was made sole consul, an indication of the abnormal circumstances of the times. In 49 BC, when the Senate seemed in danger from Caesar, Pompey was given proconsular command of all forces in Italy. This would be his last command.
Pompey achieved all this without having followed the traditional road to power. In order to appreciate how unusual his career was, it is necessary to look at the pattern of an ‘ordinary’ Roman political career.
The Cursus Honorum: A Traditional Political Career
A law enacted in 180 BC, the Lex Villia, defined the course of a public career, whereby political and military offices were set out in the order in which they were to be attained. The law also defined the length of time to be allowed between each office. This progression of offices was known as the cursus honorum.
A normal career would begin with ten years of military service, including terms as a minor magistrate or military tribune. Then, by following the steps of the cursus honorum as quaestor, aedile and so on, a man would hope to enter the Senate at about thirty years of age and be eligible for the consulship at thirty-three. Sulla modified the cursus honorum, increasing the age at which a man was able to enter particular offices. By Pompey’s time it was customary that no man could become quaestor until he was thirty, praetor until he was thirty-nine and consul until he was at least forty-two. Sulla believed that greater age would bring wisdom, and that eight years spent in public affairs would provide valuable experience.
Sources of Pompey’s Power
‘The glory of men’s ancestors is like a light shining on their descendants which allows neither their virtues nor their vices to be hidden.’ -Sallust
Pompey’s inheritance
The Romans valued the achievements of their ancestors and strove to equal or better them, so it is worth considering how Pompey’s father, Strabo, may have inspired him and what, if anything, he bequeathed to his son.
Pompey’s family owned large estates in north-eastern Italy. They were not part of the established nobility, but rather novi homines, those recently ennobled. In the Social War between Rome and her allies, Strabo was given the task of suppressing a revolt in the area. He quickly raised an army and ruthlessly put down the revolt. A successful general who pacified many hostile tribes, Strabo was awarded a triumph and made consul in 89 BC. In Pompey, Plutarch suggests that Strabo was not the most popular military commander, claiming that the Romans never hated any of their generals so much and so bitterly as they hated Pompey’s father, Strabo.
What did Strabo do to deserve such a reputation? To begin with, when he was quaestor, he tried to prosecute his own commanding officer. Such unorthodox conduct set a lot of people against him. Then, during the Social War, his savage capture of Asculum (in which there were executions, violent destruction and looting) generated more hostility. The Roman government was particularly upset because Strabo did not give his loot to the treasury, which was seriously depleted. When it was time to hand over his army to the new consul in 88 BC, the consul was murdered and Strabo was given back his command. For the remainder of the war Strabo seemed to switch sides as it suited him, as noted by Velleius Paterculus in Roman History:
‘…he maintained a doubtful and neutral attitude between the two parties, so that he seemed to be acting entirely in his own interest and to be watching his chance, turning with his army now to one side to the other, according as each offered a greater promise for power himself.’
When Strabo died in 87 BC the Romans tore his body to pieces. To his credit, Strabo has been a successful general and he had reached the consulship. He was an astute politician who took every available opportunity to extend his clients and supporters. He gave his soldiers generous rewards in money, decorations and citizenship. Pompey benefitted from the power bases established by his father. While he was consul, Strabo passed a law which gave Latin status to the towns of the Transalpine region, which meant that citizens of those towns were able to achieve Roman citizenship by holding municipal office. He gave full citizenship rights to people south of the Po River in Cisalpine Gaul. The Transalpine, Picenum and parts of Spain were to provide Pompey with vast sources of manpower and support throughout his career, both in war and in peace.
‘There was one reason and one only for the hatred felt against Strabo, namely his insatiable love of money.’ -Plutarch, Pompey
Pompey’s Personal Achievements
Strabo’s legacy to Pompey in the form of land and patronage was valuable, but it did not include the network of friendships and connections within the nobility necessary for a successful political career. The nobility despised Strabo and did not look with favour on his son. How did it come about, then, that the Senate gave Pompey such extraordinary powers throughout his career and ultimately chose him to defend them against the threat of Caesar? How did he use his military success to gain political advancement? Keep these questions in mind as we continue exploring Pompey’s career.
I. Fighting for Sulla
Pompey was only twenty-three years old when he raised three legions to fight for Sulla in the civil war against Marius. In Pompey, Plutarch tells us that Pompey provided his legions with food, transport, animals, wagons and all other necessary equipment. The troops and the wealth were part of his inheritance from his father, but Pompey must be given the credit for his victories and the uses he made of them.
If Plutarch’s account is reliable, Pompey’s first military conquests were not spectacular. While he showed considerable bravery and tactical skill, confusion among the enemy and the defection of enemy troops contributed in a large way to Pompey’s victories. Nevertheless, they impressed Sulla, who hailed the young self-appointed general as imperator (‘commander’). Sulla demonstrated his gratitude by making Pompey his legate in Sicily to pursue Marian forces based there. Once in Sicily, Pompey quickly defeated the enemy and executed prominent leaders. While Plutarch condemns the inhumane manner of this particular trial and execution, both Plutarch and Cicero give examples of other ways in which Pompey showed himself to be be a wise and humane victor. He showed humanity to the cities which had been badly treated, and leniency in bestowing pardons to others. When his soldiers acted in a disorderly way he had their swords sealed up in their scabbards and punished any who broke the seal.
II. African Campaigns
During this campaign in Sicily, Pompey received his next command, to fight Domitius in Libya. The extraordinary thing about the command was that Pompey was invested with propraetorian imperium by a decree of the Senate, even though he was clearly not eligible for such a position. In 81 BC he set off for Africa with 120 warships, 800 transports and six legions. On his arrival in Carthage, 7,000 of the enemy had immediately defected to Pompey. Plutarch gives the details of the battle against Domitius, after which the soldiers saluted Pompey as imperator. He continued into Numidia, where he restored the authority of the Roman government. According to Plutarch, it took him only forty days to annihilate the enemy army, gain control of Libya and settle relations with and between its kings.
To someone like Pompey, the settlements made after victories were just as important as the battles, as they provided the opportunity to extend influence and support. Cicero indicates that it was customary for generals who accepted the surrender of a defeated enemy to subsequently become their patrons. Pompey most certainly followed this custom throughout his career. The settlements he made with the kings of Numidia and Mauretania established a relationship for Pompey which lasted well after his death and made Africa a strong centre of resistance to Caesar.
III. Return to Rome
After his campaign in Africa, Pompey received orders from Sulla to discharge five of his six legions. For the first time Pompey disobeyed orders and returned to Rome with his full army, where he was greeted by Sulla as ‘Pompeius Magnus’. Despite the warmth of his welcome, Sulla refused Pompey’s request for a triumph. Sulla rightly argued that Pompey was not eligible because he was neither a consul nor a praetor and was far too young to be a senator.
Nonetheless, Pompey was an extremely popular young general and his recent victories were greatly appreciated. Sicily and Africa were important grain producers; had the Marians established control they could have threatened Rome’s food supply. Pompey’s tactic of returning to Rome with his army paid off. He did not have to threaten to use violence — the presence of so many of his loyal soldiers was enough to make Sulla reconsider. He relented and allowed Pompey his triumph.
IV. Changing Allegiances
Since his successes in Sicily, Pompey’s loyalty to Sulla had never been questioned. Sulla had even strengthened the bond by arranging for his stepdaughter Aemelia to marry Pompey. It must have come as some surprise, then, when Pompey used his influence to have Lepidus, an opponent of Sulla’s, elected to the consulship. What is even more surprising is that when the Senate feared that Lepidus was about to march on Rome, they declared a state of emergency, passing the senatus consultum ultimum and turned to Pompey for help. He was given propraetorian imperium to help the general Catulus put down the revolt.
During his short career, Pompey had given support to Sulla, Lepidus (an opponent of Sulla’s) and then the Senate in opposing Lepidus. This changing allegiance was to become characteristic of Pompey. He supported whoever or whatever cause offered him the greatest reward and advancement. Pompey and his army defeated Lepidus. The revolt was over and Pompey was seen by many as the saviour of the Republic. Once again he was asked to disband his troops; once again he refused. This time he wanted not a triumph, but a further command.
In Spain, Metellus Pius was fighting Sertorius, a most capable general who had won many victories against the Republic’s commanders, including Metellus. The Senate agreed to send Pompey to help Metellus. They invested him with proconsular imperium, authority far beyond what was required. Pompey’s campaign against Sertorius was not an easy one (the details can be read in Plutarch, Pompey). Some historians suggest that Pompey’s ultimate victory was due to the assassination of Sertorius by one of his own men rather than any brilliant strategy on Pompey’s part.
V. Expanding Influence
The significance of the victory over Sertorius was that it enabled Pompey to increase his clients in Spain. As victor, he assumed patronage of those he had defeated or who had surrendered to him. He was also responsible for establishing and administering new settlements. He organised towns, conferred citizenship, granted land and greatly extended the Pompeian clients established by his father. The consuls in Rome passed a law that ratified these arrangements. The strength of Spanish support for Pompey became evident later: Caesar estimates that one third of the legions he forced to surrender were made up of Spanish landowners. Later, Pompey’s sons continued to make Spain a centre of resistance, not only against Caesar but also against Augustus.
VI. The Slave Revolt
Pompey was recalled to Rome during the slave revolt led by Spartacus. The two consuls had been ineffective against the uprising and their legions had been crushed. The Senate appointed Crassus, who was then praetor, to take command. Despite Crassus having gained control of the situation by the time Pompey returned, the Senate (urged on by the people) commissioned Pompey to assist. Crassus did not really need Pompey’s help, as he had just won the decisive battle in which he killed over 13,000 slaves. Pompey missed the battle but took care of 5,000 fugitives. According to Plutarch, Pompey then wrote to the Senate saying that although Crassus had defeated the gladiators in a pitched battle, he himself had finished off the war ‘utterly and entirely’. In view of his success in Spain it seems unnecessary that he should have claimed for himself the honour due to Crassus. Crassus resented Pompey’s action, but the people of Rome were happy to acknowledge Pompey as a hero.
Pompey used this popularity to his advantage. He wanted to stand for the consulship and would have had enough support from the people to be elected, but he was not eligible. Pompey had not disbanded his army since returning from Spain, claiming that he was keeping them together for his triumph. This may have been a legitimate reason, but the presence of his legions no doubt helped the Senate to decide to dispense with the constraints on holding office set out in the Lex Annalis and allow Pompey to stand for the consulship for 70 BC.
VII. The Triumph
Towards the end of 71 BC, Pompey celebrated his Spanish triumph in a lavish fifteen-day spectacle. Crassus was rewarded with the lesser ovatio. Both men campaigned for the consulship. During this campaign Pompey revealed that he had switched political allegiance again — this time to the populares, a faction supported by the general populace. Plutarch tells us that the only fault his enemies could find in him at this time was that he paid more attention to the people than to the Senate, promising to restore to the tribunes the powers which Sulla had removed from them.
VIII. Election as Consul
Both Pompey and Crassus were elected consuls for 70 BC, and before taking office had to disband their armies and relinquish their military authority. Pompey revealed a genius for self advertisement and used the occasion to his advantage.
‘But perhaps the most enjoyable of all spectacles to the people was the one which Pompey afforded himself when he appeared in person to ask for his discharge from military service. It is an old custom at Rome that those who belong to the propertied class outside the Senate should, at the conclusion of the legal period of their military service, come into the forum, each leading his horse, and appear before the two officials called censors. Each man gives the names of the generals and imperators under whom he has served, and some account of his own actions in war, and then receives his discharge. According to his record he receives from the censors words either of praise or blame. On this occasion the censors Gellius and Lentulus were sitting in state, and the gentlemen with their horses were passing in review in front of them when Pompey was seen coming down the hill into the forum. He had all the insignia of a consul, but he was leading his horse with his own hand. When he came nearer so that he could be seen by everyone, he ordered his lictors to make way for him and then led his horse up to the bench where the censors were sitting. The people were amazed and stood in complete silence; the censors too were awed and also delighted at the sight. Then the senior censor questioned him: ‘Pompey the Great, I require you to tell me whether you have taken part in all the military campaigns that the law demands.’ And in a loud voice Pompey replied: ‘I have taken part in all of them, and all under myself as imperator.’ These words were greeted with a great shout from the people, and indeed it became quite impossible to restrain their rapturous applause; the censors rose from their seats and led the procession escorting Pompey home, this giving great pleasure to the people who followed behind, shouting and clapping.’ -Plutarch, Pompey, 22
Crassus who had followed the conventional path to the consulship, was a skilled orator, experienced with the workings of the courts and the Senate. Pompey, who made his first appearance in the Senate as a consul, was on unfamiliar ground. He was a poor speaker who had no experience of senatorial debate or proceedings. Yet if the Senate thought that this inexperience would restrict Pompey’s actions, they were very much mistaken. Also, the changes made to the Sullan constitution during 70 BC greatly weakened the Senate’s position. The powers of the tribunes were restored, the courts were reconstituted so that the Senate had only one third of the places on the juries, the powers of the censor were revived and the senatorial rolls revises. Sixty-four senators were removed and new ones were admitted, especially from the equestrian order. Throughout Italy people were given citizenship which meant that there were masses of new voters not bound by established patron-client obligations.
Pompey and Crassus had much to gain from these new arrangements; although it is difficult to judge what extent the two men cooperated in introducing them, Pompey is the one held most responsible. At the end of his term as consul, Pompey declined a proconsular command and instead waited in Rome for a more important command. Not surprisingly, the Senate did not fulfil his wishes: they were not prepared to give Pompey another opportunity to enhance his own position at their expense.
VIV. Command Against the Pirates
The next time Pompey was called upon to serve Rome was in 67 BC when pirates were making raids on Italy, pillaging shrines, taking Roman hostages and interfering with shipping in the Mediterranean to such an extent that Rome’s corn supply was affected and prices rose sharply. When the tribune Gabinius proposed that Pompey be given a command against the pirates, the Senate violently opposed him as previously mentioned. The only senator who spoke in favour was Caesar. There was a strong popular support for Pompey and a crowd attacked the Senate when they heard of the rejection of Gabinius’ proposal. Finally the Senate gave Pompey his command, which included extraordinary powers.
‘When the Romans could no longer endure the damage and disgrace they made Gnaeus Pompey, who was then their man of greatest reputation, commander by law for three years, with absolute power over the whole sea within the Pillars of Hercules, and of the land for a distance of 400 states from the coast… They gave him power to raise troops and to collect money from the provinces, and they furnished a large army from their own muster-roll… Never did any man before Pompey set forth with so great authority conferred upon him by the Romans.’ -Appian, Civil Wars
Part of that authority was the power to select twenty-four of his own legates, each of whom was to be invested with praetorian imperium. This was an ideal opportunity for Pompey to extend his patronage, to reward old supporters and attract new ones. Several of his legates later became consuls. Pompey took just three months to clear the Mediterranean of pirates. Plutarch describes how he did it in Pompey. The strategy which defeated the pirates demonstrated his military skill; his treatment of the defeated pirates demonstrated his political skill. Instead of slaughtering them, Pompey settled the pirates at various places in Asia Minor which were in need of additional population. By doing this, he encouraged the growth and prosperity of communities in key areas whose loyalty would be to Rome and to himself.
X. The Eastern Command
In 66 BC the tribune Manilius, with the support of the populares, legislated to transfer the eastern command against Mithridates from Lucullus to Pompey. This time Pompey had an influential supporter in Cicero, who spoke in favour of the bill, arguing that the prolonged campaign under Lucullus was costing the business sector and tax farmers an enormous amount of revenue. Caesar also spoke in favour of the bill; the optimates (the faction traditionally supported by the nobility) resented Pompey being given even further powers. Despite the opposition of the optimates, the bill was eventually passed by a unanimous vote of all the tribes. Pompey was given the same unlimited powers as before.
‘…to make war and peace as he liked and to proclaim nations as friends or enemies according to his own judgement. They gave him command of all the forces beyond the borders of Italy. All these powers together had never been given to any one general before; and this is perhaps the reason why they call him Pompey the Great.’ -Appian, Civil Wars
Lucullus was not impressed. Although he had not been able to end the war, he had won many victories against Mithridates VI and he now saw Pompey depriving him of the honour of his achievements. According to Plutarch, Lucullus accused Pompey of:
‘…following his usual custom of settling down, like some crazy carrion bird, on the bodies that had been killed by others and tearing to pieces the scattered remains of wars. It was in just this way that he had appropriated to himself the victories over Sertorius, Lepidus and the followers of Spartacus, though in fact these victories had been won by Metellus, Catulus and Crassus. There was therefore no reason to be surprised at his present plan of seizing for himself the glory of the Pontic and Armenian wars…’
Plutarch devotes considerable attention to the battles of the eastern campaign, where Pompey showed great leadership and military skill. However, he dismisses lightly the complex range of settlements made by Pompey after the conquest: ‘Having settled the affairs of the east and made what arrangements seemed good to him, Pompey started on his journey home.’ It was through these political and administrative arrangements that Pompey was able to consolidate his military conquests and achieve unprecedented wealth and honour.
In his settlements, Pompey followed where possible the traditional Roman practices of leaving administration to the dependent kings or city states. He recognised existing dynasties where they had proved loyal to Rome, and he reinstated or conferred authority on those leaders whom he felt could be trusted. In other areas, he annexed territory to Rome, reorganising existing provinces or creating new ones. In such cases he regulated the details of administration, as he did with his elaborate organisation for the new province of Pontus, which was divided into eleven communities, each with its own urban centre.
Through the creation and consolidation of provinces such as Pontus, Syria, Gilicia, Asia and Bithynia, Pompey was able to secure for Rome the coast of Asia Minor and the region south of the Black Sea. He also secured a network of tribute-paying client kingdoms.
‘The wealth that accrued to the conqueror himself was sufficient to make him the richest man in Rome… But more than wealth Pompeius had acquired clientelae on such a scale hitherto unwitnessed. Not merely individuals and cities but whole provinces and kingdoms acknowledged him as their patron.’ -Seager, Pompey: A Political Biography
Velleius Paterculus in Roman History indicates the value of this bond when he describes the forces Pompey summoned from the east to try to stop Caesar crossing the Adriatic. He lists ‘legions from all the provinces beyond the sea, auxiliary troops of foot and horse, the forces of kings, tetrachs and other subject rulers.’, and also ships. This support was all part of the patron-client relationship established through Pompey’s eastern settlements.
The First Triumvirate
When Pompey returned from the east in 62 BC he was the wealthiest man in Rome, and with eight legions devoted to him, he was also the most powerful. He enjoyed immense popularity with the people and had another triumph. The wealth brought with him was nearly incalculable with estimates ranging from 20,000 to 40,000 gold talents (over one billion US dollars). The annual income to Rome nearly doubled as a result of both the war spoils and tribute gold from client states. Back in Rome though, there was much concern over Pompey’s return, despite his great success. Pompey had nearly 45,000 men under his command and an incredible amount of wealth.
The Senate feared another Sullan march and forced dictatorship. But Pompey was not the man to pose that sort of threat, he was happy to return with all the power and grandeur of a conquering general. He assumed that his success would ensure settlements for his men and a position of prominence in the Senate. He found instead, upon returning home, that Rome had changed as much as the east had. New names had arisen in his absence such as the young Gaius Julius Caesar and Marcus Tullius Cicero, who would lay claim to the saviour of Rome in Pompey’s absence.
Donald L. Wasson notes that the First Triumvirate of ancient Rome was an ‘uneasy alliance’ between the three titans Gaius Julius Caesar, Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus and Marcus Lucinius Crassus. Each man had their own personal reason for joining together. The alliance lasted from 60 BC until 53 BC where the trio would dominate Roman politics. One of three would eventually rise above the others and become dictator. His name was Gaius Julius Caesar.
While the First Triumvirate could have entire articles dedicated to its intricacies alone, it was ultimately an uneasy alliance between these three men, calling on each other for support at various times, sometimes going against each other, and dominating Rome’s turbulent political landscape for nearly a decade.
End of the Triumvirate and the Steps to Civil War
56 BC — Renewal of agreement between Caesar, Pompey and Crassus at Luca. All demands were met but the potential for conflict was already evident. Pompey and Caesar had to be seen to be equal. Crassus was fighting for equal status. The Senate was split in its support for the three.
54 BC — Death of Julia. As Julia was the daughter of Caesar and the wife of Pompey, an important bond was broken. Caesar later made attempts to create a new marriage agreement to unite himself and Pompey, but decided against divorcing his wife Calpurnia, whose family was from the senatorial aristocracy.
53 BC — Death of Crassus at Carrhae. What had been a partnership of three was reduced to two. While Crassus lived, the chance of any kind of civil war was minimal — no one person was prepared to take on the other two.
52 BC — Death of Clodius. Clodius died at the hands of the gang of his rival, Milo. This was the culmination of twelve months of violence and upheaval in Rome, which resulted in the consular elections of 53 BC not being held. At Clodius’ funeral the Senate House was burnt down. The Senate perceived the situation to be so desperate they elected Pompey as sole consul.
Pompey’s sole consulship
The Senate ordered Pompey to recruit troops to be kept outside city limits. In a meeting with Caesar, Pompey agreed to support the ‘bill of the ten tribunes’ to allow Caesar to stand for the consulship of 48 BC in absentia. This would allow Caesar to remain in his province as proconsul until the end of 49 BC and thereby avoid a period of time in which he held no office and could be prosecuted for the illegal acts of his first consulship. Pompey proposed a law to change the method of appointment of provincial governors. Ordinarily, provincial governors came from the ranks of consuls and praetors who had held office in the year directly preceding their provincial command. Now they could be appointed only from the ranks of ex-consuls or ex-praetors who had not held a governorship. Hence Caesar could be replaced at any time. Pompey proposed a law that all candidates for election must appear in person. Caesar later given exemption. Pompey’s proconsulship in Spain was extended by five years. He was concurrently consul and proconsul.
51 BC — Consulship of Marcellus. Caesar’s request for an extension on his proconsulship was rejected. Marcellus led the call for Caesar’s immediate recall; this was vetoed. A decision was made in the Senate that discussions of Caesar’s position in Gaul would take place in March 50 BC. It was perfectly clear in this year that the senatorial optimates would go to any lengths to break Caesar’s power and bring him back to Rome, to the courts.
50 BC — Tribuneship of Curio. Curio was originally an enemy of Caesar but became his supporter following Caesar’s generous offer to pay off his enormous debts. He vetoed all attempts to appoint a successor to Caesar. It was proposed that both Pompey and Caesar should give up their armies and provinces. This was finally agreed to but ever enacted. The Senate decided to send two legions to deal with trouble in Parthia — one legion from Pompey, one from Caesar. Pompey asked Caesar to send the legion he had lent him in 53 BC. Hence Caesar lost two legions.
Following this, the Roman civil war had begun due to political chaos in Rome, which lasted from 49-45 BC, and a breakdown of the alliance between Caesar and Pompey. Considering our focus on Pompey in this article, a discussion on the civil war has been largely omitted. It is safe to say that this is the moment Caesar crossed the Rubicon and Pompey would see his decline.
Pompey Versus Caesar
In 50 BC, the Senate, led by Pompey, ordered Caesar to disband his army and return to Rome because his term as governor had finished. Caesar feared prosecution as Pompey accused him of insubordination and treason. In 49 BC, Caesar crossed the Rubicon with one legion which kicked off the civil war. According to Plutarch and Suetonius, Caesar quoted the Athenian playwright Menander:
‘alea iacta esto.’
(‘the die is cast.’)
In a personal letter to Pompey which can be read in Caesar’s Civil War, Caesar wrote:
‘I have always put my good name and honour first and have regarded them as more valuable than life itself. What distressed me was to find that my enemies in the most insulting manner were taking from me a privilege that had been granted to me by the Roman people; I was being deprived of six months of my command and was being dragged back to Rome although the people had ratified the proposal that I should be allowed to stand for the consulship at the next elections without being personally present. Nevertheless for the sake of the state I accepted this infringement on my rights and attack on my honour with a good grace. But when I sent a letter to the Senate proposing that both sides should disband their armies I failed to even gain this point.’
Pompey Flees Rome
In 49 BC, Pompey and his supporters fled Rome and sailed to the east, leaving Caesar in Italy. ‘Caesar faced a hostile Senate’ (Personalities of the Past, p. 231) but still made arrangements for the security of Italy. Before he left for Spain, Caesar had set up strong defensive points on both land and sea. He left Rome in April and sailed west for Massilia. In Spain, his army campaigned for forty days and was successful against some of the strongest Pompeian forces.
Caesar returned to Rome in September after detouring to Placentia in Cisapline Gaul to put down a mutiny of his own soldiers. In other areas of the empire, however, he did not achieve such success. In Africa, Curio and his troops were killed in late September. Caesar remained in Rome for eleven days and was elected consul for 48 BC — having previously been appointed dictator — and worked on producing a solution to the debt problem.
Pompey’s Assassination
In 48 BC, Caesar left Italy in January from Brundisium and sailed to the east, landing in Epirus. From here two major battles were fought: the first in March at Dyrrachium in which Pompey was successful and the second in April at Pharsalus where, according to Caesar, Pompey faced a great deal of internal squabbling. The Pompeian forces at Pharsalus outnumbered the Caesarian, but through tight discipline and Caesar’s quick reading of Pompey’s tactics, he achieved an overwhelming victory. Pompey escaped, but was not to fight another day.
Pompey sailed to Egypt via Lesbos where he met up with his wife and his son, Sextus. Caesar followed and on his arrival in Alexandria in October he was presented with Pompey’s head. King Ptolemy XIII had argued with his court on whether it was worthwhile to offer Pompey refuge with Caesar’s forces already en route. As Pompey hopped ashore in Egypt and greeted the welcoming party, he was stabbed to death by his betrayers, Achillas, Septimius and Salvius.
According to Plutarch, Caesar mourned the death of his former ally and son in law, and punished the Egyptian co-conspirators and the assassins by putting them to death. So ends the story of Pompey the Great.